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Abstract
I present an account of mass atrocity prevention based on just war theory precepts. 
This account entails comparisons among policy options and requires selecting the 
politically feasible option that has the greatest chance of avoiding atrocities. Adopt-
ing such an account of atrocity prevention highlights problems in influential mass 
atrocity prevention policy reports in that they fail to seriously consider nonviolent 
civil resistance as a mass atrocity prevention tool. Given that sometimes actors may be 
unwilling to live under the status quo, and agitate for reform by violent or nonviolent 
means, nonviolence is generally the preferable policy option. This is because under 
realistic scenarios, the empirical evidence generally indicates that nonviolent means 
are more likely to achieve positive outcomes across a range of indicators than violent 
ones. I illustrate my argument by applying it to strategies for democratisation, and 
rebut objections. Yet, nonviolent civil resistance is risky, and so revolutionary leaders 
and their supporters should weigh carefully the chances of success and the trade-offs 
of nonviolent resistance.
Keywords
Nonviolent resistance – mass atrocity prevention – responsibility to protect (r2p) – 
democratisation – revolution – just war theory
The questions I consider in this paper are how mass atrocity prevention should 
be conceived and what role, if any, nonviolent resistance has in mass atrocity 
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prevention. I contend that those focused on atrocity prevention as well as those 
striving for other ends such as democratic government should consider and 
use nonviolent resistance under certain circumstances because it is preferable 
to other policy options when assessed according to the probabilities of several 
outcomes, including the likelihood of avoiding atrocities. By offering an ac-
count of mass atrocity prevention that accepts political realities and requires 
comparison among politically feasible alternative options, my argument has 
important implications for how mass atrocity prevention should be conceived 
of and executed by both domestic and international actors.
As I discuss below, a number of mainstream mass atrocity prevention docu-
ments fail to seriously consider nonviolent mass movements as a mass atroc-
ity prevention tool, or only mention the risks of nonviolent mass movements 
without taking the additional key step of comparing the risks of nonviolent 
means to violent ones.1 At least since the authors of the iciss report wrote 
that ‘[p]revention is the single most important dimension of the responsi-
bility to protect’,2 prevention has been repeatedly emphasised as the prefer-
able way to deal with potential atrocities, for obvious reasons. In recent years, 
there has been a renewed push for prevention initiatives by the un, regional 
 organisations, and states.3 This paper aims to contribute to both the recent 
developments in the academic literature on atrocity prevention and the policy 
making process when actors are considering various means of attempting to 
avoid atrocities when working towards legitimate goals such as democratisa-
tion. Part of the conclusion of this paper is that the evidence suggests that 
nonstate actors have an important, nonviolent role to play in mass atrocity 
prevention.
1 Gareth Evans et al., The Responsibility to Protect: The Report of the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (Ontario, Canada: idrc Books, 2001); Madeleine Albright 
and William Cohen, Preventing Genocide: A Blueprint for u.s. Policymakers (United States 
Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2008), http://www.ushmm.org/m/pdfs/20081124-genocide 
-prevention-report.pdf, accessed 1 June 2018; Ban Ki-moon, ‘Implementing the Responsibility 
to Protect’, 12 January 2009, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/63/677, 
accessed 1 June 2018; United Nations, ‘Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes: A Tool 
for Prevention’, 2014, http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/pdf/framework%20
of%20analysis%20for%20atrocity%20crimes_en.pdf, accessed 1 June 2018.
2 Evans et al., The Responsibility to Protect, p. xi.
3 Jennifer Welsh, ‘The Responsibility to Prevent: Assessing the Gap between Rhetoric and Re-
ality’, Cooperation and Conflict, 51/2: 216–32 (June 1, 2016); Serena K. Sharma and Jennifer M. 
Welsh (eds.), The Responsibility to Prevent: Overcoming the Challenges of Atrocity Prevention, 
1st edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).
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The paper is organised as follows. First, I defend an account of mass atroc-
ity prevention that draws on just war theory precepts to make comparisons 
among various realistic policy options that requires selecting those policies 
that minimise the risk of atrocities (holding other things constant). Second, I 
show that some influential mass atrocity prevention documents fail to present 
atrocity prevention in this way by either omitting, or only emphasising the risks 
of, nonviolent mass movements. Third, I consider and rebut several objections 
by showing that nonviolent methods are more likely than violent methods to 
meet just war theory precepts and avoid atrocities in some circumstances, and 
that nonviolence is not necessarily overly demanding. Throughout, I illustrate 
my argument with a discussion of nonviolent and violent means of attempting 
democratisation.
 Conceptualising Mass Atrocity Prevention and Just War Theory 
Precepts
In this section, I argue that those seeking to prevent atrocities should use just 
war theory precepts in order to make politically realistic comparisons among 
various policy options and select the ones that are most likely to be successful 
while meeting other just war theory precepts. In seeking to achieve certain just 
causes, actors should consider whether their actions are likely to meet widely 
accepted moral principles. In deciding whether the use of force is permissible 
and preferable to alterative options, there are several just war theory precepts 
that are relevant here. These include just cause, necessity, proportionality, and 
reasonable chance of success. Each is a rich concept that, for reasons of space, 
I can only briefly describe here. A just cause is a goal that is a weighty moral 
good. Just war theorists include the defence of innocents from atrocities and 
national self-defence as quintessential just causes for war. Another just cause 
for the use of force that John Locke to present day just war theorists coun-
tenance is resistance against an unjust government that persistently violates 
important individual rights.4 Although there are various accounts of neces-
sity, which is sometimes called last resort in its ad bellum form,5 it roughly 
4 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1689 [1988]), para. 225; Allen Buchanan, ‘The Ethics of Revolution and Its Implications for the 
Ethics of Intervention’, Philosophy & Public Affairs, 41/4: 291–323 (2013); Christopher J. Finlay, 
Terrorism and the Right to Resist: A Theory of Just Revolutionary War (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2015).
5 Eamon Aloyo, ‘Just War Theory and the Last of Last Resort’, Ethics & International Affairs, 
29/2: 187–201 (2015), pp. 191–192.
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holds that the option that is likely to harm the fewest innocent people must 
be selected.6 Proportionality requires that the expected harms to innocents 
from a given policy must be less than the goods of achieving the same goal.7 
Because war causes great harms to people, destroys property, and damages the 
environment, many just war theorists believe that there must be some reason-
able chance that the use of force will achieve a just cause. Generally, just cause, 
necessity, and proportionality are necessary conditions for the use of force to 
be permissible.
These principles are useful in mass atrocity prevention work for two reasons. 
First, they outline some of the main relevant moral considerations, such as 
harms to innocents. Second, they require a comparative analysis among vari-
ous policy options. This latter point is important because mass atrocity preven-
tion tools include a wide range of nonviolent and violent means. What, then, 
is mass atrocity prevention? This may seem too obvious to merit discussion, 
but it is worth a brief explanation for reasons that will become clear. Atroc-
ity prevention entails enacting policies by states domestically, international 
actors including foreign states and international organisations, and nonstate 
actors that are reasonably expected to decrease the risk of atrocities compared 
with other politically feasible options. This consists of two components. One 
requires using available evidence to assess which policies are most likely to 
prevent atrocities. Such analysis should rely on empirical evidence to assess 
overall risks and the chance of success of various policy options, and scrutiny 
of the specific case in question in order to assess how various policy options 
are likely to impact the specific situation. Second, it requires comparing all 
pertinent permutations of various options. It is insufficient, for instance, to 
simply compare doing nothing with a military intervention. Finally, the analy-
sis should account for political constraints, especially what other actors are 
likely to do in response to various policies.
Determining which policies are preferable can be accomplished by selecting 
the policy that will likely result in the lowest risk of atrocity, based on severe 
harms to innocents. Following Jeff McMahan, I define innocents as individuals 
who are in no way liable to defensive harm, and by liable to defensive harm I 
mean someone has forfeited her right against being physically attacked.8 First, 
actors should weigh competing options for achieving their goals, including 
nonviolent and violent methods, with likely harms to innocents of each op-
tion as a key variable. Second, actors should select the option with what will 
6 Seth Lazar, ‘Necessity in Self-Defense and War’, Philosophy & Public Affairs, 40/1: 3–44 (2012).
7 Thomas Hurka, ‘Proportionality in the Morality of War’, Philosophy & Public Affairs, 33/1: 
34–66 (2005).
8 Jeff McMahan, Killing in War, 1st ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 8.
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likely be the best overall outcome, including refraining from any (violent or 
nonviolent) actions. As I discuss further below, this does not definitively settle 
proportionality calculations, because some goods are difficult (and perhaps 
impossible) to compare,9 such as democracy and number of lives of innocents 
lost, but nonetheless it provides a rough guideline.
Finally, mass atrocity prevention should entail trying to prevent the worst 
sorts of atrocities. Not all atrocities are morally equivalent. For instance, al-
though both the murder of 50,000 and 8 million innocent civilians could 
constitute genocide, the latter is far worse because of the far larger number 
of innocent people killed, holding all else constant. Of course, mass atrocity 
prevention strategies should aim at preventing all atrocities, but, to the extent 
possible, they should also aim at preventing the worst sorts of atrocities.
 Nonviolent Resistance in Key Mass Atrocity Prevention Documents
Although the iciss report discusses widely accepted just war theory precepts 
that should act as guidelines for how to implement military measures,10 part 
of the problem of some key mass atrocity prevention documents is that the 
authors seem to fail to make comparisons of the probabilities of atrocities oc-
curring among various ways to achieve a just cause. One way they do this is by 
only emphasising the risks of nonviolent and violent actions without consid-
ering the relative risks between the two options. In this section, I discuss how 
influential policy documents portray the role of nonviolent mass movements. 
In the section that follows I show that even if nonviolent mass movements in-
crease the risk of mass atrocities compared with business as usual, they may 
still be the preferable policy option compared with violent options because 
violent options generally increase the risk of atrocities even more than non-
violent ones, and sometimes revolutionary groups are unwilling to back down.
Mass atrocity prevention has become an important aim of some govern-
ments, international organisations, and civil society actors. In 2005, for in-
stance, governments agreed to the World Summit Outcome Document, which 
included governments accepting the responsibility to prevent genocide, crimes 
against humanity, war crimes, and ethnic cleansing.11 Governments have 
9 David Rodin, War and Self-Defense (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 115.
10 Evans et al., The Responsibility to Protect, pp. 31–37.
11 United Nations, ‘World Summit Outcome Document’, 2005, paras. 138–139, http://daccess 
-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/487/60/PDF/N0548760.PDF?OpenElement, 
accessed 1 June 2018.
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 established a variety of policy tools aimed at atrocity prevention, including 
diplomacy, foreign aid, various types of sanctions, travel bans, arms embargos, 
preventive deployment of peacekeepers, and armed humanitarian interven-
tion, among others. Learning from the failures of the international community 
in the Balkans and Rwanda in the 1990s, a group of distinguished international 
experts developed the idea of the responsibility to protect (r2p) under Cana-
dian leadership in 2001.12 A number of countries have established domestic 
mechanisms to address atrocity prevention, such as President Barak Obama’s 
Atrocities Prevention Board, which he created in 2012 under the leadership of 
Samantha Power.13 The un Secretary General appointed the first Special Advi-
sor for the Prevention of Genocide in 2004 and the first Special Advisor for 
Responsibility to Protect in 2008. ngos and centres such as the Global Centre 
for r2p, The Asia-Pacific Centre for r2p, The European Centre for r2p, and the 
Aegis Trust have mandates focused on mass atrocity prevention.
Yet key atrocity prevention documents have only briefly mentioned nonvio-
lent resistance, omitted substantive discussion it as a means of atrocity pre-
vention (one exception is James Pattison’s work on civilian peacekeepers),14 or 
only mentioned the risks of mass nonviolent resistance. This is somewhat sur-
prising for two reasons. First, nonviolent methods are generally preferable to 
violent ones. Second, even if nonviolent movements might increase the risks 
of harms to some innocent people, policy makers should still consider these 
approaches if the only other viable policy options are likely to result in greater 
numbers of harms to innocents.
Some of the most important recent policy documents related to the preven-
tion of mass atrocities and the r2p that I will briefly discuss to illustrate my 
point include the (2001) report of the ‘International Commission on Interven-
tion and State Sovereignty’ (iciss), Albright and Cohen’s (2008) ‘Preventing 
Genocide: A Blueprint for u.s. Policymakers’ (known as gptf), the (2009) un 
Secretary General Report on r2p that lays out the idea of three ‘pillars’ of r2p, 
12 Evans et al., The Responsibility to Protect.
13 Barack Obama, ‘Presidential Study Directive on Mass Atrocities (psd 10)’, 4 August 2011, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/08/04/presidential-study-directive 
-mass-atrocities, accessed 1 June 2018; Tessa Alleblas, Eamon Aloyo, Sarah Brockmeier, 
Philipp Rotmann, Jon Western. In The Shadow of Syria: Assessing the Obama Administra-
tion’s Efforts on Mass Atrocity Prevention (The Hague Institute for Global Justice, April 
2017), http://www.thehagueinstituteforglobaljustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/
In-the-Shadow-of-Syria-final-1.pdf, accessed 1 June 2018.
14 James Pattison, ‘Unarmed Bodyguards to the Rescue? The Ethics of Nonviolent Interven-
tion’ in Michael L. Gross and Tamar Meisels (eds.), Soft War: The Ethics of Unarmed Con-
flict, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), pp. 134–51.
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and the (2014) un ‘Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes’. I also include an 
important overview of atrocity prevention by Scott Strauss. There are of course 
more mass atrocity prevention and r2p policy documents, including other re-
ports by the un Secretary General on r2p. But the documents on which I will 
focus are well-respected, influential, and representative of mainstream r2p 
and mass atrocity prevention policy debates. My point in reviewing these doc-
uments is not to contest that nonviolent resistance may increase the chance 
of atrocities, the empirics of which I discuss below. Rather, it is to show that 
staple mass atrocity prevention documents generally only emphasise the risks 
of atrocities from nonviolent resistance, whereas comparing the likelihood of 
atrocities of various policy options is the preferable means to assess various 
atrocity prevention strategies.
The 2001 iciss report originates the concept of r2p. Its authors list four cat-
egories of tools relevant for mass atrocity prevention, only one of which per-
mits violence. The types of tools they identify include diplomatic or political, 
economic, legal, and military means.15 They also differentiate root and proxi-
mate prevention actions. In a discussion of the root cause prevention mea-
sures, the iciss commissioners mention ‘democratic institution and capacity 
building’, but do not discuss theories of democratisation.16 They emphasise the 
importance of prevention17 and nonviolent options,18 but they fail to mention 
the role mass nonviolent movements can have in achieving these goals.
In contrast, Albright and Cohen’s influential 2008 report briefly mentions 
nonviolent protests. Citing Barbara Harff ’s 2003 article19 and ‘subsequent anal-
ysis of mass killing by the pitf’ (Political Instability Task Force), they claim 
that nonviolent protests increase the risk of genocide.20 Harff studies the risk 
factors for the onset of genocide and political mass murder. The independent 
variable that comes closest to nonviolent protest is what Harff calls ‘political 
upheaval’.21 She defines this ‘as an abrupt change in the political community 
caused by the formation of a state or regime through violent conflict, redraw-
ing of state boundaries, or defeat in international war’.22 This variable includes 
at least two forms of violence, civil and international war, undermining the 
15 Evans et al., The Responsibility to Protect, pp. 23–27.
16 Ibid., para. 3.21.
17 Ibid., p. xi.
18 Ibid., para. 3.18–3.23, 3.25–3.31.
19 Barbara Harff, ‘No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and 
Political Mass Murder since 1955’, American Political Science Review, 97/1: 57–73 (2003).
20 Albright and Cohen, ‘Preventing Genocide’, p. 25.
21 Harff, ‘No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust?’, p. 62.
22 Ibid.
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claim in the gptf. This leaves Albright and Cohen’s team subsequent analysis 
as the source for this claim. Because the authors of the Albright and Cohen re-
port provide no further detail on how they conducted this analysis, there is no 
way to further assess their claim. Although they do not cite it (for it was pub-
lished after the gptf report), an influential article by pitf group is then a logi-
cal place to look.23 The authors of that article include a variable called ‘adverse 
regime change’, but in this measure they exclude peaceful (as defined as less 
than 1,000 deaths in one year) adverse regime changes that resulted in democ-
racies24 and refer back to the 2003 paper by Harff for the onset of genocide and 
politicide.25 They do not provide comparisons of the relative probability be-
tween violent and nonviolent actions that may increase the risk of atrocities.
In 2009, the un Secretary-General released a seminal report on r2p. In it, 
he enumerates the conditions under which states and the international com-
munity have various responsibilities under r2p. The Secretary-General argues 
that states have the primary responsibility to protect their populations (Pillar 
One), the international community has the responsibility to assist states (with 
their consent) in upholding their responsibilities under r2p (Pillar Two), and 
only when states are manifestly failing to uphold their responsibilities can the 
international community use coercive measures including but not limited to 
the use of force (Pillar Three). The report mentions the role nonstate actors, 
including civil society, business, and individuals, can play in r2p.26 Given the 
consensus that r2p focuses on states, it is of little surprise that in the context 
in which the author mentions nonstate actors in the report, he concentrates 
on roles of civil society other than replacing state leaders. For instance, he dis-
cusses the role of activists in the us attempting to influence policy towards Su-
dan regarding the genocide in Darfur, but never mentions a group like Otpor, 
which was a central factor in ending Milosevic’s rule.27
The authors of the 2014 un Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes brief-
ly mention mass protests, but they include it only as a risk factor. Under risk 
factor 1.10, they write that ‘social instability caused by resistance to or mass 
protests against State authority or policies’ increases the chances of atrocity.28 
23 Jack A. Goldstone, Robert H. Bates, David L. Epstein, Ted Robert Gurr, Michael B. Lustik, 
Monty G. Marshall, Jay Ulfelder, Mark Woodward , ‘A Global Model for Forecasting Politi-
cal Instability’, American Journal of Political Science, 54/1: 190–208 (2010).
24 Ibid., p. 192.
25 Ibid., p. 197n11.
26 Ban, ‘Implementing the Responsibility to Protect’, paras. 11(b), 27, 59.
27 Ibid., para. 59.
28 United Nations, ‘Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes: A Tool for Prevention’, p. 10.
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The authors of this document provide no citation by which to evaluate this 
claim. The authors go on to mention that ‘armed conflict has been identified 
as the strongest or most important contributing risk factor’, but provide no sys-
tematic discussion of why nonviolent resistance may therefore be preferable to 
violent means of attempting to achieve a just cause.29
In 2016, Scott Straus released an important overview of mass atrocity 
prevention findings.30 In it, he includes violent government crackdown on 
protests as a triggering event that increases the risk of mass atrocities.31 Suf-
ficiently grave widespread or systematic attacks on civilians can constitute a 
crime against humanity or other type of mass atrocity. In another chapter, one 
on preventive policy options, he does not mention nonviolent protests as a 
means to mitigate the risk of atrocities.32 Thus, Straus too emphasises only the 
risks of nonviolent action.
In sum, several influential mass atrocity prevention documents fail to seri-
ously consider the role of nonviolent mass movements in atrocity prevention, 
either by omitting such an option or by only emphasising its risks. In the sec-
tions that follow, I argue such an omission and exclusive focus on potential risks 
is misguided, because the benefits of nonviolent movements as alternatives 
to violent ones sometimes outweigh the risks. But first I briefly discuss how 
nonviolence may be preferable to violent ways of attempting democratisation.
 Democratisation, and the Probability of Successes of Violent and 
Nonviolent Movements
In order to provide some context under which nonviolent movements can 
be used as an atrocity prevention method and because it is one of the most 
important goals for activists living under non-democratic regimes, I will now 
use the struggle for democratic government as an example. An important 
objection to using nonviolent resistance in such circumstances is that non-
violent means may be less likely than violent means to achieve this important 
goal. Another objection is that nonviolent resistance is more likely to result in 
atrocities than violent resistance because nonviolent activists cannot defend 
29 Ibid., p. 7.
30 Scott Straus, Fundamentals of Genocide and Mass Atrocity Prevention (United States 
Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2016), https://www.ushmm.org/m/pdfs/Fundamentals-of 
-Genocide-and-Mass-Atrocity-Prevention.pdf, accessed 1 June 2018.
31 Ibid., pp. 86–87.
32 Ibid., ch. 6.
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themselves. A third concern is that nonviolent resistance is overly demanding 
because it requires individuals to refrain from otherwise typically justified self 
and other defence. I will consider and rebut each objection in turn.
Democratic activists in autocratic countries first face the important ques-
tion of whether to mount a sustained campaign against a ruling regime in or-
der to try to install a democratic government. If they decide to move ahead 
with a democratisation campaign, they must then decide whether to resist an 
autocratic regime by violent or nonviolent methods (or a mixture). There are 
stark differences between the violent and nonviolent options. Think of the 
armed resistance in Syria, which started after peaceful protests did not quickly 
remove Assad, compared with the generally peaceful protesters in Egypt. There 
may be ambiguities on the margins, as relatively small-scale violence may oc-
cur by generally peaceful protesters, but there are major differences between 
the armed rebellion and peaceful nonviolent approaches.
The evidence suggests that nonviolent means are generally more successful 
than violent means of replacing leaders in general and in autocratic regimes 
specifically, and creating democratic government. In a seminal study, Erica 
Chenoweth and Maria Stephan find that from 1900 to 2006 nonviolent means 
were, on average, about twice as likely as violent means to successfully over-
throw a government,33 even though violent campaigns were more than three 
times as likely to receive foreign support.34 Mauricio Celestino and Kristian 
Gleditsch study nonviolent and violent campaigns and find that from 1900 to 
2004 nonviolent movements substantially and statistically significantly in-
creased the chance that autocracies would transition to democracies,35 where-
as violent campaigns had no effect on whether an autocratic country would 
transition to democracy.36 Another scholar who studies democratic transi-
tions during the ‘third wave’ of democratisation, Jan Teorell, finds that from 
1972–2006 nonviolent protests—but not violent conflicts—contributed to de-
mocratisation.37 Barbara Geddes, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frants released a 
33 Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of 
Nonviolent Conflict (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), pp. 66–67, 72–73.
34 Ibid., p. 54.
35 Mauricio Rivera Celestino and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, ‘Fresh Carnations or All Thorn, 
No Rose? Nonviolent Campaigns and Transitions in Autocracies’, Journal of Peace Re-
search, 50/3: 385–400 (2013).
36 Ibid., p. 393.
37 Jan Teorell, Determinants of Democratization: Explaining Regime Change in the World, 
1972–2006 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), chap. 5.
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dataset in 2014 that lends preliminary evidence in support of these findings.38 
They find that nonviolent campaigns are more likely than violent revolts to 
result in democratisation.39 Controlling for several variables, Chenoweth and 
Stephan find that five years after the end of a successful campaign, including 
revolutions, ending occupations, and secession, less than 5% of successful vio-
lent campaigns resulted in democracies, whereas 57% of successful nonviolent 
ones had democratic results, a greater than 10 fold difference.40 Other scholars 
find that a country having a nonviolent mass movement as it transitions to 
democracy increases the chance the country will sustain democracy41 and de-
creases the chance of a democratic breakdown by about 50%.42
Additionally, reformers were about twice as likely to partially achieve their 
goals if they used nonviolent means compared with violent ones.43 Nonviolent 
campaigns occurred more frequently in autocratic regimes than in democratic 
countries,44 and in autocracies nonviolent movements were more likely to suc-
ceed than violent rebellions.45
Some might think that nonviolent methods might be more likely to achieve 
positive goals compared with violent means, but it might seem that together 
nonviolent and violent tactics are the most likely to overthrow a government. 
However, pairing violence with nonviolence is no more likely to be success-
ful than nonviolent campaigns.46 But what happens if the regime uses vio-
lence against peaceful demonstrators? Even in the face of violent crackdowns, 
maintaining nonviolence is still ‘considerably more effective than violent 
resistance’.47 Protesters increase their probability of success by over 20% if 
they maintain nonviolence in the face of regime violence.48
38 Barbara Geddes, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz, ‘Autocratic Breakdown and Regime 
Transitions: A New Data Set’, Perspectives on Politics, 12/2: 313–331 (2014).
39 Ibid., p. 325.
40 Chenoweth and Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works, pp. 213–15.
41 Markus Bayer, Felix S. Bethke, and Daniel Lambach, ‘The Democratic Dividend of Nonvio-
lent Resistance’, Journal of Peace Research 53/6: 758–71 (2016).
42 Ibid., pp. 759, 767–68.
43 Chenoweth and Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works, pp. 72–73.
44 Ibid., pp. 66–67.
45 Ibid.
46 Erica Chenoweth and Kurt Schock, ‘Do Contemporaneous Armed Challenges Affect the 
Outcomes of Mass Nonviolent Campaigns?’, Mobilization: An International Quarterly, 
20/4: 427–51 (2015).
47 Chenoweth and Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works, p. 68.
48 Ibid., p. 51.
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Not all revolutions succeed. Therefore, we should also consider the likely 
outcomes of failed violent and nonviolent revolutions. Examining violent 
and nonviolent campaigns in situations of revolutions, ending occupations, 
and secession, Chenoweth and Stephan find that countries in which a failed 
nonviolent campaign occurred have a greater than 33% chance of becoming 
democratic five years after the campaign ends, whereas failed violent cam-
paigns have a less than 4% chance of being democratic five years later.49 Ap-
proximately the same chances hold when a country is autocratic at the end of 
a violent and nonviolent campaign.50
What impact do violent and nonviolent movements have on the probability 
of war? We know that according to various calculations over different time 
periods, the vast majority of atrocities occur during war.51 Avoiding civil war 
therefore decreases the risk of atrocities, on average. Nonviolent mass move-
ments have irenic effects after a revolution. Chenoweth and Stephan find that 
after successful overthrow of governments, secession, or expulsion or occu-
pies, nonviolent campaigns are more likely to avoid civil war than are violent 
rebellions.52 Specifically, a violent campaign has a 42% probability of result-
ing in a civil war within a decade of the campaign ending, whereas a country 
that has had a nonviolent campaign has a 28% chance of a civil war, a one 
third decrease.53 Pairing a violent campaign with a nonviolent one drastically 
increases the chance of civil war reoccurring too: a civil war within a decade 
of the end of a violent and nonviolent campaign is nearly 50% likely.54 This 
is broadly consistent with other scholars’ findings regarding civil wars. For in-
stance, 9 out of 10 civil wars in the 2000s were reoccurrences of previous civil 
wars.55 In sum, across a range of outcomes, nonviolent movements are more 
likely to achieve democracy, avoid civil war, and avoid atrocities—whether or 
not the movements themselves are successful.
49 Ibid., p. 216.
50 Ibid., p. 259n.20.
51 Alex Bellamy, ‘Mass Atrocities and Armed Conflict: Links, Distinctions, and Implications 
for the Responsibility to Prevent’, Policy Analysis Brief (The Stanley Foundation, 2011), 
p. 2, http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/publications/pab/BellamyPAB22011.pdf; Charles 
H. Anderton, ‘Datasets and Trends of Genocides, Mass Killings, and Other Civilian Atroci-
ties’ in Charles H. Anderton and Jurgen Brauer (eds.), Economic Aspects of Genocides, Other 
Mass Atrocities, and Their Prevention, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 69.
52 Chenoweth and Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works, chap. 8.
53 Ibid., p. 217.
54 Ibid., p. 218.
55 Barbara F. Walter, ‘Why Bad Governance Leads to Repeat Civil War’, Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, 59/7: 1242–43 (2015).
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 Violent and Nonviolent Resistance, and the Probability of 
Atrocities
Do nonviolent protests against a government increase the risk of repression 
and atrocities, and if so how does this compare to violent resistance? This con-
cern that nonviolent resistance can increase the risk of atrocities should be 
taken seriously for two reasons. First, democratic activists and foreign policy 
makers who support their aims need to be careful that the goods they are try-
ing to achieve do not inadvertently lead to horrific outcomes. Second, those 
striving for democratic government should consider likely responses from gov-
ernments in deciding whether various options are likely to meet just war theo-
ry precepts. Thus, we must examine the empirical evidence of various violent 
and nonviolent policies and make assessments regarding probable outcomes.
There is evidence that certain types of domestic threats to a government’s 
hold on power can increase the risk of mass atrocities by a government.56 
In summarising the literature on the causes of atrocities, Straus writes that 
‘[a]rguably, the strongest macro-level predictor of the onset of genocide and 
mass killing is the presence of large-scale instability’.57 But the instability he 
has in mind is violent instability, including civil war, violent rebellions, and 
coups.58 Many have found that violence against a regime increase the chances 
of atrocities. Benjamin Valentino, Paul Huth, and Dylan Balch-Lindsay find 
that mass killing increases significantly when guerrilla insurgencies pose a 
threat to the ruling regime.59 Gary Uzonyi finds that coups, assassinations, and 
guerrilla war, generally increase the risk of atrocities.60 Matthew Krain finds 
that civil wars are one of the biggest risk factors for atrocities.61 International 
war also increases the risk of atrocities. Uzonyi finds that the onset of mass 
killings  increases by over 300% during interstate war, holding a number of 
other variables constant.62 In short, war and many types of violent threats to 
a government substantially increase the chances of atrocities. Decreasing the 
chance of civil war, therefore, significantly decreases the chance of atrocities. 
56 Gary Uzonyi, ‘Domestic Unrest, Genocide and Politicide’, Political Studies, 64/2: 315–34 
(2016).
57 Straus, Fundamentals of Genocide and Mass Atrocity Prevention, p. 55.
58 Ibid., pp. 55–57.
59 Benjamin Valentino, Paul Huth, and Dylan Balch-Lindsay, ‘“Draining the Sea”: Mass 
Killing and Guerrilla Warfare’, International Organization, 58/2: 375–407 (2004).
60 Uzonyi, ‘Domestic Unrest, Genocide and Politicide’, pp. 323–25.
61 Matthew Krain, ‘State-Sponsored Mass Murder: The Onset and Severity of Genocides and 
Politicides’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 41/3: 331–60 (1997).
62 Uzonyi, ‘Domestic Unrest, Genocide and Politicide’, p. 323.
Downloaded from Brill.com02/04/2019 09:10:13AM
via Leiden University
 461Conceptualising Mass Atrocity Prevention, Nonviolent
global responsibility to protect 10 (2018) 448-470
<UN>
From a rich literature on the democratic peace, we also know that democracies 
rarely go to war with one another. Because nonviolent movements are more 
likely to achieve democratisation, they too contribute in this way to conflict 
prevention and therefore mass atrocity prevention.
Major nonviolent campaigns also often provoke a deadly response from 
governments.63 Yet scholars show that nonviolent mass protests will not simi-
larly increase the risk of mass atrocities compared with violent threats to a 
regime. Some scholars have found that nonviolent protests, revolutions, and 
strikes do not increase the onset of highly repressive periods, whereas guerrilla 
war and attacks do,64 and that peaceful demonstrations65 and revolutions66 
against the government do not increase the risk of genocide or politicide. One 
type of nonviolent protest against a government, strikes, do increase the risk 
of genocide (but not politicide).67 Krain has found that extra constitutional 
change does not increase the risk of onset of government sponsored mass 
murder,68 although if mass murder does occur, it increases its severity.69 He 
does not, however, compare the effects of violent and nonviolent extra consti-
tutional changes on the impact of chances of onset or severity of mass atroci-
ties. Chenoweth reports that governments are about three times more likely to 
commit atrocities against armed groups than against nonviolent movements 
(23% rather than 68%).70 In another paper, Jay Ulfelder also finds that the ef-
fect of civil resistance campaigns on atrocity onset is ‘essentially zero’.71 As 
Chenoweth, Perkoski, and Kang write, ‘a consensus finding has emerged that 
nonviolent dissent tends to elicit less intense government repression than vio-
lent forms of dissent’.72
63 Erica Chenoweth, ‘Trends in Nonviolent Resistance and State Response: Is Violence To-
wards Civilian-Based Movements on the Rise?’, Global Responsibility to Protect, 9/1: 86–100 
(2017). p. 92.
64 Sabine C. Carey, ‘The Use of Repression as a Response to Domestic Dissent’, Political Stud-
ies, 58/1: 167–186 (2010), p. 177.
65 Uzonyi, ‘Domestic Unrest, Genocide and Politicide’, p. 324.
66 Ibid., p. 323.
67 Ibid., pp. 324, 329–30.
68 Krain, ‘State-Sponsored Mass Murder’, pp. 348–49.
69 Ibid., p. 354.
70 Chenoweth, ‘Trends in Nonviolent Resistance and State Response’, p. 90.
71 Jay Ulfelder, ‘Forecasting Onsets of Mass Killing’ (Unpublished Manuscript, 2012), p. 10, 
http://politics.as.nyu.edu/docs/cp/1293/Forecasting_Onsets_Mass_Killing.pdf, accessed 
1 June 2018.
72 Erica Chenoweth, Evan Perkoski, and Sooyeon Kang, ‘State Repression and Nonviolent 
Resistance’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 61/9: 1950–1969 (2017), p. 1960.
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In sum, the evidence suggests that some types of nonviolent movements do 
increase the risk of atrocities, but not as much as violent threats against a gov-
ernment, and that nonviolent movements do not have a significant impact on 
the chances of mass atrocity onset. Nonetheless, one might then conclude that 
nonviolent mass protests should therefore be avoided because there is some 
evidence that nonviolent resistance increases the risk of violence and atroci-
ties. Despite some less than clear sourcing for their claims, it turns out that the 
main mistake of authors of some key atrocity prevention documents concern-
ing nonviolent resistance was not in the empirical analysis, but in their sub-
sequent logical analysis. The conclusion that nonviolent movements should 
always be avoided does not follow from the finding that nonviolent resistance 
may increase the risk of atrocities compared with doing nothing.
Even if nonviolent protests increase the risk of atrocities compared with no 
resistance to a government’s autocratic rule, they still might be preferable to al-
ternative, violent strategies because the latter might have a greater increase of 
the risk of atrocities and might be less likely to achieve just aims. Activists may 
be unwilling to back down. The politically feasible options may be to wage re-
sistance violently or nonviolently (or both). Of course, in addition to this com-
parison, activists should consider whether it is a good idea to wage any form of 
resistance at all (as well as other means of achieving their just aims). Thus, we 
should ask the following questions, drawing on widely accepted moral princi-
ples. First, which violent or nonviolent strategies would be necessary and pro-
portionate, even when a regime unjustly harms innocent protesters? Second, 
even if there is some chance that nonviolent democratic movements might 
indirectly result in an atrocity, might they still be the best option available?
This second question might seem odd. To see why it is not, imagine the fol-
lowing hypothetical situation. Suppose a wave of democratisation protests 
breaks out somewhere. Imagine that revolutionaries and foreign government 
meet to decide how to move ahead. Suppose that the revolutionaries are com-
mitted to democratisation and will not back down: the choice they have given 
themselves is between armed resistance and nonviolent resistance. Stopping 
all action and returning to daily life is another option. Imagine there is a coun-
try where democratic activists are planning a movement to replace current 
leaders with democratic ones. Suppose that if they use nonviolent methods, 
the best estimate of the number of innocent people who will be killed is 
around 500. Assume that this could constitute a crime against humanity. Sup-
pose a violent revolt is expected to result in 5000 deaths of innocent civilians. 
Furthermore, suppose that if a regime were left in place it would unjustly kill 
an estimated 100 people per year for the foreseeable future, whereas a new 
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democratic government would kill unjustly 10 people per year. What is the best 
option? I argue that nonviolent methods are the better option, compared with 
violent revolt as well as with doing nothing under these circumstances and 
given what we know about the likely chances of success of various means of 
democratisation. This is because the nonviolent option has the highest chance 
of resulting in both the good of democracy and the lowest expected number 
of deaths of innocents over the medium to long term (specifically, >5 years).
Another concern is that nonviolent resistance is least likely to be effective 
against those regimes that are most willing to commit atrocities. There are 
three responses to this concern. First, there are at least some examples of non-
violent movements playing a pivotal role in ousting leaders who have already 
committed terrible atrocities, and those leaders leaving power without com-
mitting additional atrocities against the protesters. Slobodan Milošević is one 
example. Even though nato intervened militarily against his regime twice, he 
remained in power after each military operation. Yet mass nonviolent protests, 
organised by leaders of Otpor, played a vital role in ousting him from power in 
2000. Part of the reason they succeeded, according to one of Otpor’s leaders, is 
because they convinced the police not to use violence against the protesters.73 
Second, even if repression of nonviolent protest leads to an atrocity— 
imagine 800 deaths of protesters constitutes a crime against humanity—it may 
be preferable to taking up arms because it is still statistically less likely to result 
in even worse atrocities, and more likely to result in democracy. Third, nonvio-
lent protests should not be seen as a panacea. Presumably there are some cases 
where the chances of success are too low to make violent or nonviolent action 
advisable. Some state or nonstate actor would likely commit horrific massacres 
against nonviolent protesters. Sometimes the least worst option may be to try 
to survive under a non-democratic regime without collectively agitating for 
democratisation.
Given the evidence I present above and the ethical precepts from just war 
theory, it is preferable in an average situation to maintain nonviolent  resistance 
than it is to take up arms. This is because on average nonviolent resistance 
is more likely to achieve democracy and less likely provoke the government 
to commit atrocities in response to a challenge to its power. Nonviolent resis-
tance should be a standard policy option, especially when considered as an 
alternative to war and violent struggle for democratisation.
73 Chenoweth and Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works, pp. 46–47.
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 Is Nonviolent Resistance Overly Demanding?
Even if the preceding argument is correct, nonviolence resistance as an atroc-
ity prevention policy faces an important objection, namely that it imposes an 
unfairly demanding burden on innocent individuals by requiring them to re-
frain from exercising their right to use defensive violence when they or others 
are unjustly attacked. The objection runs as follows. Everyone has a right to 
bodily integrity (udhr 3). There are certain things one can permissibly do in 
defence of this right. One can retreat and block blows. But one can also use 
defensive force against an unjust attacker if it is necessary and proportionate 
to avert the unjust threat. The objection is that nonviolent resistance is prob-
lematic because it requires an overly burdensome curtailment of the violent, 
defensive means of exercising and protecting the vital human right of bodily 
integrity.
There are two replies to this objection. The first involves what Wesley 
Hohfeld calls a ‘power’.74 These are second order rights that allow the right 
holder to modify the first order right.75 For instance, one can waive, annul, or 
transfer to another person some rights. In this case, the relevant second order 
right is waiving. That is, one can decide to waive one’s right to violent self or 
other defence.76 Waiving a right involves consensually refraining from using a 
right for some period of time. Just as one can waive the right against being at-
tacked in situations like boxing and wrestling, one can decide to not use one’s 
right to violent self-defence in situations where one is working for political 
reform. Nonviolent resistance is not overly burdensome because individuals 
can consent to waive their right to violent self-defence. Of course, it does not 
make it permissible for the state (or any other actor) to harm or kill any non-
violent protester because one is not waiving one’s right to bodily integrity.77 
Rather, a person is waiving one means of protecting that right. This would per-
mit the use of nonviolent action as a means to achieve other goals even with 
the knowledge that state security forces are likely to harm some innocent non-
violent protesters.
Another reply to the objection focuses on proportionality. It holds that vio-
lent means of achieving a just cause are less likely to be proportionate than are 
74 Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, ‘Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning’, The Yale Law Journal, 23/1: 16–59 (1913), pp. 44–54.
75 Leif Wenar, ‘The Nature of Rights’, Philosophy & Public Affairs, 33/3: 223–252 (2005), 
pp. 230–37.
76 Finlay, Terrorism and the Right to Resist, p. 93.
77 Ibid.
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nonviolent means and that therefore activists working for a just cause are not 
only permitted to use nonviolent means but generally must do so, given that 
violent means are likely to be disproportionate. A widely accepted constraint 
on the use of force as a means of self and other defence is that it must be 
proportionate (as well as necessary, but I will focus on proportionality here). 
It is useful here to differentiate ‘narrow’ and ‘wide’ proportionality, as Jeff 
McMahan does.78 Narrow proportionality assesses whether a response to the 
individual or individuals who are liable to defensive harm is permissible. It 
roughly requires that the harm inflicted on the liable attacker be less than or 
commensurate with the unjust threat.79 Liability to defensive harm means 
that someone has forfeited to some degree at least one right (the right to bodily 
security) as someone is posing a threat. (The reasons why and how someone 
becomes liable are interesting and contested {merely posing a threat, some 
degree of responsibility for posing the threat, whether the threat is subjectively 
or objectively unjust, and so on}, but need not concern us here.) For instance, 
if someone is threatening to stomp on your foot, it would be disproportionate 
to shoot and kill him with a gun because the small threat to you is incommen-
surate with the great harm to the attacker. If you could not easily move your 
foot, it might be permissible to push the attacker so that he becomes unbal-
anced and must step back, thereby preventing harm to your toe. Wide pro-
portionality involves potential harm to innocents.80 Wide proportionality can 
involve the response from the victim or from the attacker. For instance, before 
a victim shoots at an unjust attacker, she must consider whether a stray bullet 
may hit an innocent bystander. But she must also consider the response of oth-
er government soldiers in response to a violent means of justified self-defence. 
Generally, the proportionality constraint on the defensive use of force only 
permits violent defensive action if it is likely to meet both wide and narrow 
proportionality. Given the empirical literature on likely outcomes of violent 
and nonviolent means of say agitating for democratic government, wide pro-
portionality is especially relevant here. It might be permissible for a protester 
to shoot and kill a soldier who has unjustly opened fire on peaceful protesters, 
but if the regime’s forces then slaughter a great number of innocent civilians 
because of the (just) use of force by the protester, such force might render the 
narrowly proportionate use of force against the soldier impermissible because 
the actions of the regime could be widely disproportionate.
78 McMahan, Killing in War, pp. 20–21.
79 Ibid., pp. 20–21.
80 Ibid., p. 21.
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Christopher Finlay describes what he terms ‘the proportionality paradox’.81 
He means by this that ‘some regimes will attempt to curb resistance by imposing 
costs sufficient to render resistance by all available avenues disproportionate’.82 
In other words, what might otherwise be permissible (nonviolent or violent) 
actions could be rendered impermissible because of the harsh and specifically 
widely disproportionate response that a regime would inflict in response to 
the nonstate actions. Given what we know about the likely outcomes of vio-
lent and nonviolent means of attempting democratisation, violent means are 
much more likely to provoke violent crackdowns that would render them im-
permissible compared with nonviolent options.
 Nonviolent Resistance, r2p and State Sovereignty
Furthermore, some may raise the worry that some proponents of r2p have 
voiced concerning the armed intervention against Libyan dictator Muammar 
Gaddafi. They argue that because targeting Gaddafi’s forces overstepped the 
un Security Council mandate, it weakened the r2p norm, and used the pre-
vention of mass atrocities as pretext for regime change.83 As Ramesh Thakur 
notes in a discussion of the armed humanitarian intervention in Libya, ‘All the 
brics countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) objected strongly 
to the shift from the politically neutral posture of civilian protection to the par-
tial goal of assisting the rebels and pursuing regime change’.84 Similarly, critics 
of regime change could object to attempting to replace autocratic leaders with 
democratic leaders and institutions because they argue that state sovereignty 
matters, even though it can be forfeited under certain conditions when mass 
atrocities are ongoing. There are several responses to this objection.
81 Finlay, Terrorism and the Right to Resist, pp. 151–54.
82 Ibid., p. 153.
83 Regime change may be more closely connected to r2p than may be politically conve-
nient. Alex Bellamy presents historical data showing that government-committed atroci-
ties that resulted in at least 5,000 deaths end most often when leaders themselves decide 
to end them, but ‘some degree of regime change’ is the second most prevalent way for 
them to end, constituting approximately 40% of the cases. See Alex Bellamy, ‘The Re-
sponsibility to Protect and The Problem of Regime Change’ in Don E. Scheid (ed.), The 
Ethics of Armed Humanitarian Intervention, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 
pp. 168–69.
84 Ramesh Thakur, ‘r2p after Libya and Syria: Engaging Emerging Powers’, The Washington 
Quarterly, 36/2: 61–76 (2013), p. 70.
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First, as Welsh argues, preventing mass atrocities is inherently ‘cont-
roversial’.85 I know of no way to avoid how contentious mass atrocity preven-
tion efforts are in cases of attempted democratisation through nonviolent mass 
movements or other means. Leaders may have to make trade-offs in building 
political support for r2p and in implementing strategies like nonviolent resis-
tance that may be the most effective means of prevention.
This does not mean that one should easily dismiss objections such as the 
ones raised by representatives of the brics, and I offer several responses to 
their concerns here. The important questions are to what extent foreign in-
tervention constitutes coercion and when does it violate state sovereignty. 
There are not easy or clear lines, except in extreme cases. Domestic nonvio-
lent protests without significant foreign involvement would not violate state 
sovereignty because the protests are domestic, by definition. Nevertheless, 
international state and nonstate actors could play a role in promoting non-
violent movements through educational campaigns, peer-to-peer learning, fi-
nancial support, etc. There is a wide continuum of foreign influence, from the 
non-coercive example of reading Gene Sharp’s manual on nonviolent revolt 
that was reportedly popular in Egypt during the Arab Spring,86 to peer-to-peer 
learning,87 to the potentially more contentious foreign funding of nonviolent 
groups.88
Foreign support of peaceful, nonstate groups highlights a limitation to the 
state-centric, three pillar model of r2p.89 The literature suggests that nonvio-
lent action may be a useful way to avoid atrocities when attempting democ-
ratisation, but Pillars One and Two focus, respectively, on a state’s domestic 
responsibilities and on the international community assisting a state to avoid 
atrocities. If it is possible to contribute to preventing atrocities by peacefully 
supporting nonstate actors before atrocities occur, state and nonstate leaders 
should consider how to incorporate this into, or revise, the three-pillar model. 
There are strong reasons to support preventing atrocities, rather than only 
being able to interfere in a state’s domestic affairs without the leader’s con-
sent after they have already started, as politically contentious as this would 
85 Welsh, ‘The Responsibility to Prevent’, p. 217.
86 Janine Di Giovanni, ‘Gene Sharp, Theorist of Power’, The New York Times, 3 September 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/09/t-magazine/gene-sharp-theorist-of-power.html, 
accessed 1 June 2018.
87 David D. Kirkpatrick and David E. Sanger, ‘Egyptians and Tunisians Collaborated to Shake 
Arab History’, The New York Times, 13 February 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/14/
world/middleeast/14egypt-tunisia-protests.html?pagewanted=all, accessed 1 June 2018.
88 Chenoweth and Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works, p. 54.
89 Ban, ‘Implementing the Responsibility to Protect.’
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be. Just as there are varying degrees of military intervention (supplying arms, 
training rebels, covert action, overt action, etc.), there are various means of 
supporting nonviolent mass protests (as mentioned above). Presumably some 
types of support would be more acceptable to certain state leaders than oth-
ers. Although this would not directly address the objection, state leaders could 
also consider covert means to support nonviolent groups.90 That said, there 
are some things the international community can do overtly within the three-
pillar model. The international community could encourage and incentivise 
states to refrain from committing atrocities against peaceful groups agitating 
for change under Pillar Two, and use higher levels of support such as foreign 
funding to groups that use nonviolent methods if and when states begin com-
mitting atrocities against protesters who have legitimate aims.
Because most types of nonviolent protests decrease the chances of atroc-
ity compared with most violent means of revolution on average, nonviolent 
protest actually decreases the chance that states would use force to stop an 
ongoing atrocity compared with domestic sources of violent means of democ-
ratisation. Rather than being inconsistent with r2p, such peaceful options 
could be seen to be what states themselves agreed to in 2005.91 If violent for-
eign intervention is generally worse and more controversial than nonviolent 
foreign influence, and foreign support for nonviolent civil resistance decreases 
the chances of foreign armed intervention, this suggests another reason why 
nonviolent movements are often preferable to violent ones.
In addition to the theoretical bases for action, there are several practical 
benefits to nonviolent mass protests compared with other policy options. 
These include lower economic and political costs to foreign actors interested 
in avoiding atrocities (and promoting democracy) compared with other meth-
ods. As Benjamin Valentino argues, armed humanitarian intervention can be 
extremely expensive compared with other ways of addressing atrocities.92 It 
is generally monetarily cheaper to prevent atrocities than to expend resourc-
es to attempt to stop and rebuild after them. Sending in the military to end 
atrocities once they begin can be politically costly too. It is in the international 
community’s interests in general to avoid the refugees and idps that war and 
atrocities create, because of their political, economic, and moral costs.
90 Heather M. Roff, ‘Covert Actions and the Responsibility to Protect’, Global Responsibility to 
Protect, 7/2: 167–89 (2015).
91 United Nations, ‘World Summit Outcome Document’, paras. 138–139.
92 Benjamin A. Valentino, ‘The True Costs of Humanitarian Intervention: The Hard Truth 
About a Noble Notion’, Foreign Affairs, 90/6: 60–73 (2011).
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There are additional reasons why foreign actors should also favour nonvi-
olent movements. Using data from successful revolutions from 1955 to 2004, 
Nam Kim finds that revolutionaries who gain power through violence are 
more likely to commit mass killings than are leaders who gain power by con-
stitutional methods.93 Kim also finds some evidence that violent revolution-
ary leaders are more likely than nonviolent leaders to commit mass killings.94 
Uzonyi also finds that violent revolutionary leaders who successfully take pow-
er have increased risks of committing politicide.95 Of course, all leaders should 
avoid atrocities. But these findings have important implications as to whether 
external actors should support groups that use violent or nonviolent means.
 Conclusion
By emphasising the risks of nonviolent resistance and thereby excluding non-
violent resistance from the atrocity prevention policy toolbox, especially as an 
alternative to violent resistance, some authors of key atrocity prevention docu-
ments promote the opposite of what they intend. Policy documents should 
include all politically realistic options that can decrease the risk of atrocities. 
The argument I present shows that when mass atrocity prevention is appro-
priately understood as selecting politically feasible policies that will likely de-
crease the risk of atrocities, nonviolent action can play a critical role in atrocity 
prevention. Both domestic and international actors interested in mass atrocity 
prevention and r2p should revise their standard toolbox in order to include 
nonviolent resistance. Domestic actors should be interested in nonviolent re-
sistance because of its comparative chance of success and the decreased risks 
of atrocities. External actors focused on promoting democracy and atrocity 
prevention should be interested in it for strategic as well as moral reasons. In-
ternational actors should support and encourage nonviolence among those 
who are agitating for democracy and trying to achieve other ends, at least to 
the extent this is compatible with r2p, and possibly even if it goes beyond the 
three-pillar understanding of r2p if on balance it is likely to save a greater 
number of lives of innocents than other options. This support and encourage-
ment could take multiple routes including providing education and training 
93 Nam Kyu Kim. ‘Revolutionary Leaders and Mass Killing’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 
62/2: 289–317 (2018).
94 Ibid., pp. 306–308.
95 Gary Uzonyi, ‘Civil War Victory and the Onset of Genocide and Politicide’, International 
Interactions, 41/2: 365–391 (2015).
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for leaders of revolutionary movements, facilitating peer-to-peer learning by 
for instance providing financial support for leaders of previous nonviolent 
struggles to travel to and educate emerging non-states leaders leading demo-
cratic revolutions, refraining from arming rebels, and so on. Although it is not a 
panacea, and should be used cautiously given the risks it carries regarding pro-
voking atrocities, including nonviolent resistance in the mass atrocity toolbox 
could increase the chance of saving lives and avoiding atrocities.
 Acknowledgements
For their helpful feedback on earlier drafts of this paper, I would like to thank the 
anonymous reviewers, Tessa Alleblas, Samir Naser, Edward Newman, Karambu 
Ringera, Geoffrey Swenson, James Pattison, Savita Pawnday, Scott Wisor, and 
the organisers and participants at the University of Leeds workshop on r2p on 
13–14 October 2016. I am grateful to Netherlands Organization for Scientific Re-
search (nwo) (grant W 08.400.121) and The Hague Institute for Global Justice 
for support on this paper. Any mistakes are solely my responsibility.
Downloaded from Brill.com02/04/2019 09:10:13AM
via Leiden University
